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Abstract 
 
Insider misuse is a key threat to organizations. 
Recent research has focused upon the information 
itself – either through its protection or approaches to 
detect the leakage. This paper seeks a different 
approach through the application of transparent 
biometrics to provide a robust approach to the 
identification of the individuals who are misusing 
systems and information. Transparent biometrics are a 
suite of modalities, typically behavioral-based that can 
capture biometric signals covertly or non-intrusively – 
so the user is unaware of their capture. Transparent 
biometrics are utilized in two phases a) to imprint 
digital objects with biometric-signatures of the user 
who last interacted with the object and b) uniquely 
applied to network traffic in order to identify users 
traffic (independent of the Internet Protocol address) 
so that users rather than machine (IP) traffic can be 
more usefully analyzed by analysts. Results from two 
experimental studies are presented and illustrate how 
reliably transparent biometrics are in providing this 
link-ability of information to identity.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Insider misuse have become widespread in the last 
decade and has been considered an important security 
issue by many recent research studies [1-6]. Whilst 
much research has been undertaken into the detection 
of insider misuse and particularly information leakage, 
less focus has been attributed to linking this to the 
people who are committing the criminal activity. 
Assuming many will utilize stolen credentials from 
colleagues to perpetrate the misuse, there is frequently 
a reliance upon other security controls to verify the 
identity of the person responsible (i.e. through the use 
of logs, CCTV etc), if indeed this is possible at all. 
This paper focusses upon the application of 
transparent biometrics to the problem of insider misuse 
in two differing scenarios that together provide robust 
identity verification, enabling incident analysts and/or 
forensic examiners a reliable, efficient and effective 
process for identifying the responsible individual. The 
first phase deals with the problem of understanding 
who is actually responsible for leaking the information. 
As a user interacts with a computer, biometric signals 
are capture covertly (enabling biometric techniques 
such as facial recognition, keystroke analysis, 
behavioral profiling, iris recognition) to be imprinted 
within the digital object being used. In this manner, all 
digital objects will be covertly imprinted with the 
biometric signature of the user who has last interacted 
with it. Upon detection of the misuse, the biometric 
signature can be recovered and this will identify the 
individual who sent it – negating the need for 
expensive and time consuming investigation of system. 
Having identified the user, an investigator will want to 
understand what else the user has been up to. 
Organizational network traffic logs provide an 
independent basis for understanding this – however, 
due to the mobile nature of the workforce and the 
nature of DHCP, it has long been understood that IP is 
not a reliable means of filtering traffic. The use of 
multiple devices further compounds the issue as the 
device will be given differing IP addresses upon each 
connection. The second phase, utilizes a novel feature 
extraction process and applies behavioral profiling to 
the network traffic to provide investigators with all the 
traffic associated with a particular user (rather than 
machine), enabling a far more efficient analysis of user 
activity. 
The paper is structured with Section 2 providing an 
overview of the background literature in insider misuse 
and transparent biometrics. Section 3 describes the 
system architecture and processes that underpin the 
approach. Section 4 presents two sets of experiments to 
illustrate the feasibility of applying transparent 
biometrics focused around both phases. Section 5 
presents a discussion with Section 6 providing the 
concluding remarks and direction of the future work. 
4031
Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41647
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND
  
 
2. Background  
 
2.1. Insider Misuse 
  
Typically, there are three main types of threats that 
insiders could commit, Internet technology sabotage, 
insider theft of intellectual property and insider fraud. 
The majority of research within the field has been 
focused upon the detection rather than the response. 
Several academic studies were published with the aim 
of combating the issue of insider misuse. Some studies 
have tried to use biometric information as a factor for 
detecting the malicious activities of an insider by 
measuring the individual’s biometric signals and in 
particular when they change, for example Heart Rate 
Variability (HRV), core body temperature, and skin 
temperature [7]. The authors claim that there is a 
correlation between these signals change and 
individual’s malicious intent. Clearly their 
experimental setup is rather controversial, and there is 
neither a distinct nor strong correlation between their 
hypotheses or the actual implementation to the data 
loss detection/prevention. Other researchers 
investigated the feasibility of linking persons with the 
leakage incidents by inserting a fake data (object) into 
the confidential data that they want to protect [8-11]. 
However, such an approach is not a simple task to 
achieve, even with methods such as the guilt 
identification model, which is designed precisely for 
the case when a data distributor has given sensitive 
information to a group of supposedly trusted agents. 
Other authors proposed monitoring systems that 
operate proactively for forensic and audit purposes [12-
15]. While such techniques could provide 
comprehensive logs and detailed information about 
actions performed by the user, it fails to biometrically 
link an incident to those individuals who conducted 
them. Indeed, there is no current literature that has 
specifically sought to transparently embed biometric 
signatures in digital objects. Whilst the use of network 
traffic to identify individuals has been the focus of 
many studies, results have not been encouraging due to 
the level of noise and the uniqueness of features being 
utilized in the biometric system [16-19]. They have 
tended to use very raw features such as individual 
packet or flow-based information or even source IP – 
which is not appropriate. The approach in this paper is 
to apply the extensive knowledge of transparent 
biometrics to develop a unique set of features from raw 
network metadata that are focused specifically upon 
the user. 
 
2.2. Transparent Biometrics 
 
With the aim of providing continuous protection for 
IT services and their data, a number of research studies 
were conducted to investigate the use of biometrics for 
transparent and non-intrusive authentication over the 
last 15 years. For example, a thin-client based topology 
is proposed by [20] that utilized face recognition to 
enable transparent authentication on mobile devices; 
while DARPA proposed an Active Authentication 
research program aiming to address the problem of the 
point-of-entry technique by utilizing behavioral-based 
biometrics for desktop computing [21]. Based upon 
their characteristics (either physiological or behavioral 
based), details of existing studies on transparent 
biometrics are presented in the following subsections. 
 
2.2.1. Physiological Transparent Biometrics. The 
physiological biometric based systems utilize the 
characteristics of a human body part (e.g. fingerprint 
and face) to identify individuals. In general, 
physiological biometric characteristics contain high 
levels of discriminatory information and are resistant to 
various factors (e.g. age, body fitness or the weather 
conditions). Traditionally, physiological biometric 
techniques are solely used as an alternative point of 
entry authentication method. With the advancement of 
sensors, several transparent authentication techniques 
started to emerge. [22] and [20] utilized face 
recognition to provide continuous and transparent 
authentication for desktops and mobile devices 
respectively. [23] proposed a fast and fully automatic 
ear recognition approach based on 3D local surface 
features for generic usage; while [24] investigated an 
implicit authentication technique based upon ear 
shapes during a call session on smartphones. By using 
touch screens, [25] and [26] demonstrated that 
fingerprint identification can be utilized to provide 
transparent and continuous protection for mobile 
devices. In addition, the use of iris recognition (one of 
the most accurate biometric technique) for real-time 
continuous authentication was also investigated [27]. 
 
2.2.2. Behavioral Transparent Biometrics. 
Behavioral biometrics identifies a person based upon 
their unique behavior, such as the way they type on a 
keyboard. In contrast with physiological biometric 
techniques, behavioral based methods are less unique 
as human behaviors tend to change over time due to 
various reasons (e.g. social environment or mood); 
however they are more flexible and user-friendly, 
hence a natural candidate for transparent 
authentication. Indeed, researchers have been carried 
out a number of studies. Initially, the two most 
common user behaviors with the computing 
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environment (i.e. the use of mouse and keyboard) were 
investigated for the purpose of continuously and non-
intrusively authenticating users: mouse dynamics [28-
32] and keystroke analysis [33-35]. Then, with the 
prevalence of mobile devices, several new behavioral 
biometrics were explored for the same purpose (i.e. 
transparent authentication), including voice verification 
[36, 37], gait recognition [38, 39] and behavioral 
profiling [40].  
The field of transparent biometrics has become 
more established in recent years with a significant 
focus upon the development of more reliable 
modalities and the underlying management system that 
provides a degree of intelligent context support. 
 
3. A Proactive and Reactive Approach  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the core of the 
architecture is built around the capturing, processing 
and classification of biometric signals derived from 
built-in sensors within the computing technology that 
can be captured without the explicit interaction by the 
user. The transparent, continuous and multimodal 
capture of the biometric signals is key to mitigating 
against forgery [41]. Whilst a perpetrator might be able 
to steal password credentials or even forge a biometric, 
to do so continuously and against a wide-range of 
modalities is extremely challenging (there are few 
studies that have successfully hacked a multibiometric 
system let alone a continuous and transparent 
multibiometric system). This provides for a strong 
basis of ensuring it is the user who is using the system 
whose biometrics are captured rather than someone 
they might be masquerading to be. 
The source of biometric signals differs depending 
upon the proactive or reactive approach. The proactive 
is focused upon the capture and analysis of signals 
captured via the client computer. The reactive 
approach is focused upon deriving a behavioral-based 
profile from the network traffic. 
 
3.1. Proactive Approach – Biometric 
Imprinting 
 
The proactive approach focuses upon establishing a 
reliable correlation between individuals and the digital 
object (e.g. an email, an image file or a document) that 
is being used. This correlation is achieved by mapping 
the hexadecimal representations of the extracted 
biometric features of the user with the hexadecimal 
representations of the object. This process generates a 
digital imprint file representing locations within the 
object, each of which corresponds to a respective 
portion of the extracted biometric features.  
These corresponding locations are the main element 
of the resulted imprint file and with perhaps some extra 
information (e.g. object metadata, timestamp). 
Thereby, the imprint file does not carry any direct 
biometric signal but rather the locations that 
correspond to the biometric signal. 
Since any file type can be represented in 
hexadecimal form, this makes the proposed method a 
generic approach that works with any object type—as 
long as it is in form of a digital object. 
 
 
Figure 1: Insider Misuse Identification Architecture 
The generated imprints are then stored in a 
centralized database for later use when needed. For 
instance, upon the detection of misuse such as data 
leakage, the object (whether it is posted on a public 
website or captured by the network) can be analyzed 
for extracting the imprinted biometric signals by 
reversing the mapping process. Hence, an investigator 
could establish the identity of the user who interacted 
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with the object by processing the extracted biometric 
feature with the biometric system and compared 
against the database of users. 
 
3.2. Reactive Approach – Network 
Fingerprinting 
 
The reactive part of the insider misuse 
identification architecture (i.e. network fingerprinting) 
aims to identify individual users via their interactions 
of various network-based services, assisting 
investigators to narrow down the pool of potential 
suspects when an incident occurs. In order for the 
network fingerprinting technique to work accurately, 
two critical processes need to be completed: the 
extraction from raw traffic of user interactions 
(application-level descriptions of user interactions 
rather than raw traffic) which form the template and 
the identification strategy used to classify and link 
network traffic.  
During the template creation stage, users use their 
network services (e.g., Facebook, Google) and the 
Feature Extraction function extracts various metadata 
information, including the date and time stamps and 
various header information of the IP packet (e.g., 
sender and receiver’s IP address and port numbers, the 
size of the packet) and the User Interactions function 
derives interaction signatures on different user 
activities within network based services. The novelty 
of this approach is unlike current research that focusses 
upon which service a user might user (e.g. Facebook) 
and for how long, these user interactions are able to 
discern more discreet information as to what the user 
was doing whilst using the service (e.g. messaging on 
Facebook, watching a video, reading the all). This 
additional granularity of user-specific information 
provides a richer source of discriminative information. 
In order to ensure the template quality, sufficient 
network data is required to be collected over a period 
time; also, due to the nature of the behavioral biometric 
technique, the template will be regularly renewed. 
The user identification process is required when an 
incident occurs. During this process, all network 
metadata related to the incident will be analyzed. 
Similar to the template creation process, the network 
traffic metadata is utilized by Feature Extraction 
function and then the User Interactions function. These 
interactions are then compared to the template database 
to obtain a probabilistic identification.  
Once the identification process is completed, the 
network traffic will be prioritized based upon the 
identification outcome and visualized according to 
identified users. In this way, the investigator can make 
a sensible decision upon which part of the network 
traffic should be focused first. 
4. Experimental Analysis  
 
In order to assess the feasibility of the utilizing 
transparent in this proactive and reactive manner, two 
experiments were devised to investigate the core 
functionality. 
 
4.1. Proactive Biometric Imprinting 
 
The ability to capture, extract and imprint a digital 
object with a transparent biometric signature is not a 
technically challenging task (and is already the subject 
of a patent by the authors [42]). The key research 
question with respect to the imprinting of the biometric 
signature is how robust is the approach given 
subsequent modification of the digital object. As such 
the following two experiments were undertaken that 
simulate two types of attacks that might occur to a 
digital object after the imprinting process has occurred: 
• The first experiment simulates the case where the 
imprinted image was modified in several parts. 
This type of attack is very influential since various 
and random parts of the image are affected by such 
alterations. The modified parts are determined 
randomly (an example of which is shown in Figure 
2).  
• The second attack scenario simulates the case of 
when only part of the imprinted image is available 
and the rest is missing; for instance, the imprinted 
image could be resized or cropped. To simulate 
such alterations, a random section of the images in 
the dataset was cropped in different sizes after 
been imprinted. Figure 3 illustrates an example of 
some of these cropped samples.   
 
 
Figure 2: Sample of a modified multiple parts 
of an image 
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Figure 3: Samples of a cropped image in 
certain percentage 
 
In the experiments, the feature vector used is a real 
facial feature vector sample with a length of 57 
numeric characters, as illustrated in Figure 4. The 
length of the vector does vary but this is fairly 
representative of the type and length of information 
that would need embedding. In this study, Fisherfaces 
algorithm is used to generate the feature vector for the 
captured users’ faces images [43]. The UCID image 
dataset version 2 is used for to simulate both attacks 
and evaluates the performance of the proposed 
technique [44]. For the purpose of this study, only the 
first 100 images are used from this dataset, since it is 
assumed that this number is enough for the purpose of 
evaluation. Each of the 100 images was modified from 
0 to 100% and whether the feature vector could be 
retrieved noted. 
 
 
Figure 4: Facial feature vector 
 
The experimental results show that the imprinted 
feature vectors are successfully retrieved, even when 
the images are altered in a significant manner. Figure 5 
illustrates the averaged percentage of images where the 
feature vector was successfully retrieved. The printing 
of the black boxes (signifying modification) does 
consequently affect the mapped indexes’ values. 
Therefore, many of the imprints become useless after 
such an attack. However, despite massive destruction 
on the image with the increased rate of the 
modification, it is possible to recapture the feature 
vector from some of those images, even up to 95% 
modification with some images.  
 
 
Figure 5: Number of images with successful 
retrieved feature vectors under multiple parts 
modification attack 
 
Figure 6: partial image attack 
 
In the second experiment, the results show the 
feature vector is retrieved and reassembled 100% 
among all the tested images. This means that by giving 
only part of the original imprinted image (as small as 
5% of the original file), it is possible to restore the 
feature vector to its original state. In addition, the 
results in Figure 6 shows that the average, maximum, 
and minimum numbers of a retrieved feature vector 
cross on all examined images (i.e. 100 images). 
However, these results were obtained by assuming that 
the preserved indexes of the hexadecimal values of 
interest are not changed after the cropping process. 
This means that all of the imprints in the database are 
correlated with the questioned samples as a part of the 
original images. In practice this is not always possible 
since the original object might not be accessible or 
available after the imprinting process took a place. 
 
4.2. Reactive Approach - Network 
Fingerprinting 
 
Users can perform a wide range of activities within 
different online services, such as reading news, sending 
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emails, editing documents, and chatting with friends. If 
users were “profilable” based upon their interactions 
with online services (i.e. not only knowing which 
service they are using but also what they are doing 
with the service such as uploading pictures, listening to 
audio, watching a video, instant messaging) rather than 
merely relying upon their IP addresses (as the current 
state of the art presents), it would be easier for network 
security analysts to track down involved individuals 
when an incident occurs.  
The novel approach to feature extraction seeks to 
remove the noise and low-level information created at 
the packet-level and attempt to derive application –
level user interactions. Based upon this hypothesis, 9 
Internet services (i.e. BBC, Dropbox, Facebook, 
Google, Hotmail, Twitter, Skype, YouTube and 
Wikipedia) were selected due to their popularity [45].  
Various user actions within each aforementioned 
service were performed and their corresponding 
network signals were collected via Wireshark. In order 
to increase the accuracy of the analysis, each user 
action was manually tested 20 times by three 
individual researchers to explore the relationship 
between user actions with their network signals. A list 
of network metadata parameters were utilized for the 
analysis: the date and time stamp, the IP addresses of 
source and destination, their port numbers, protocol ID 
(either TCP or UDP), the length of a datagram, and 
several TCP flags (e.g. SYN, FIN, ACK and PUSH). 
In general, user actions can be represented in three 
forms via their network metadata: a single packet, 
multiple packets and a stream of packets [46]. When a 
user action is carried out, 1) only one packet is sent to 
the server; 2) 2-4 packets which are sent to the server 
within less than a one-millisecond timeframe; 3) a 
stream of packets (with similar payload size) that are 
sent to the server within 100 microseconds one after 
another . Table 1 illustrates the results of this process 
and also describes in detail the form that each 
interaction pattern in each application.  
 
In total, 46 users completed the data collection 
process during the period of 12 November 2014 to 11 
January 2015. Also, ethical approval was obtained 
from the Faculty Research Ethics Committee of the 
authors’ university. A total of 112 Gigabytes of IP 
header information was accumulated. Each user’s data 
is stored in an individual SQLite database file; also, 
each record contains the following fields: a time and 
date stamp (e.g. 2015.01.15.22:38:05.587341), 
sender’s IP address and port number, receiver’s IP 
address and port number, the packet length, the type of 
traffic (e.g. TCP) and the flags (e.g. SYN and FIN).   
Based upon the above observation from Table 1, a 
user’s interaction databases were created for each of 
the 9 chosen Internet services (as illustrated in Table 
2). In total, 5,285,384 activities records across 9 
services were collected from the 46 users during the 
aforementioned experimental period.  
 
Table 1: User Actions Derived from 9 chosen 
services 
 
User 
Interactions 
No. of 
packets 
Total 
length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
BBC 
Page 
navigation Stream Various Server > Client 
Watching 
video Stream ~MTU  Server > Client 
Listening to 
audio Stream ~MTU Server > Client 
Dropbox 
Download  
files Stream ~MTU  Server > Client 
Upload files Stream ~MTU Client > Server 
Folder 
navigations Two 155 Client > Server 
Facebook 
Page loading Stream Various Server > Client 
Attach files One ~MTU  Server > Client 
Chat 2 2,625+ Client > Server 
Typing 2 1,502 Client > Server 
Google 
Page 
navigation Multiple 268 Server > Client 
Editing Multiple 270 Server > Client 
Hotmail 
File 
attachments Stream ~MTU Client > Server 
Compose an 
email One 981 Server > Client 
Insert a 
recipient One 917 Client > Server 
Skype 
Text messages One 794+ Client > Server 
Audio calls Stream 129-147 Both Clients 
Video calls Stream 1165-1365 Both Clients 
File transfer Stream ~MTU Sending Client>  receiving client 
Click on 
contacts One 731 Client> Server 
Idle One 572 Client > Server 
Twitter 
Tweet One 192+ Client > Server 
Upload Stream ~MTU  Client > Server 
Click contact One 747 Client > Server 
Ideal / Reading Multiple 625+ Server > Client 
Wikipedia 
Viewing Stream ~MTU Server > Client 
YouTube 
Watch videos Stream ~MTU Server > Client 
Upload videos Stream ~MTU  Client > Server 
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Table 2: An Overview of User Interactions with 
Each Service    
Services Users Single Multiple Stream Total 
BBC 30 9.64% 15.60% 74.76% 36,994 
Dropbox 31 71.21% 26.51% 2.28% 108,168 
Facebook 46 63.53% 30.95% 5.52% 1,619,741 
Google 46 60.09% 34.39% 5.52% 878,434 
Hotmail 45 67.99% 28.20% 3.81% 227,469 
Skype 31 73.62% 14.48% 11.89% 260,623 
Twitter 46 56.70% 35.34% 7.96% 172,213 
Wikipedia 44 12.00% 31.81% 56.19% 14,720 
YouTube 45 44.39% 43.26% 12.35% 1,967,022 
 
In order to successfully identify users through their 
service interactions, a classifier that can discriminate 
individual users based upon their behavioral activities 
is required. Several Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
techniques, including Feedforward Multi-Layer 
Perceptron (FF MLP) neural network, Radial Basis 
Function (RBF) neural network, and Self-Organising 
Map (SOM), can be utilized for this purpose. Amongst 
them, FF MLP was chosen as the default classifier 
based upon its previous performance within the 
transparent authentication domain [40, 47, 48].  
With the aim of investigating the feasibility of 
identifying users via their network activities, a set of 
experiment was conducted upon the 9 Internet services 
of the 46 users’ two month data. The experiment was 
carried out within the Matlab R2013a environment on 
a Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit Operating System with 
Intel Core i7-2600 CPU (3.4 GHz) and 16 GB 
memory. Based upon the outcome of some initial 
testing, a network size of 40 neurons FF MLP with the 
trainlm training function was utilized. In order to 
ensure sufficient data for both training and validation 
processes, a minimum 200 of user interactions were set 
for each service; also, a fixed size (i.e. 60% of the 
predefined threshold) was set to the training data that 
was randomly selected; while if uneven data sizes were 
chosen, a bias would be introduced by the neural 
network towards those with more training samples. 
Moreover, all features apart from the user’s IP address 
were used from each record as the input vector; 
obviously, a classifier would not be required if the 
user’s IP address were utilized due to it is distinct 
uniqueness within the given dataset. As the classifier 
was configured in the identification mode, the True 
Positive Identification Rate (TPIR) is used to measure 
the performance accuracy. By using this setup, a set of 
experiments were conducted on all users and services 
and each configuration was repeated 5 times, and the 
average performance was calculated.  
Once the experiment was completed, the result for 
each user’s all services was accumulated to check the 
overall performance. In general, the average TPIR is 
47.5%, respectively for all users’ all services, 
suggesting almost half of the network traffic activities 
can be identified to individual user by using user’s 
interaction. In addition, a breakdown of the results for 
each user is illustrated in Table 3. The Table contains 
the user IDs, the Total Number of User Interactions 
(TNUI) during the chosen period, and the performance. 
The table is sorted based upon the user ID. The best 
and worst performance was 86.3% and 12.6% (in terms 
of TPIR), achieved by users 40 and 2 respectively.  
 
Table 3: Overall identification results for each 
user with all services 
 
User 
ID TNUI 
TPIR 
(%) 
User 
ID TNUI 
TPIR 
(%) 
1 9,835 62.8 24 97,688 81.8 
2 82,165 12.6 25 16,936 54.7 
3 27,666 32.8 26 36,248 27.1 
4 441,831 19.2 27 21,828 67.1 
5 104,086 69.2 28 24,232 41 
6 58,469 51.5 29 296,048 43.4 
7 72,374 23.1 30 111,951 45.9 
8 83,873 43.8 31 65,628 51.6 
9 310,364 42.9 32 319,239 68.6 
10 34,310 39.1 33 961,357 51.9 
11 40,496 39.6 34 206,768 32.9 
12 171,949 26.8 35 95,501 73.7 
13 50,776 42.7 36 150,750 56.4 
14 34,337 42.2 37 26,297 51 
15 147,776 39.2 38 113,918 31.1 
16 8,492 29.9 39 137,543 59.6 
17 1,992 59.4 40 2,270 86.3 
18 24,701 41.6 41 104,722 56.7 
19 71,610 49.7 42 16,662 73.9 
20 118,655 28.6 43 13,952 46 
21 28,328 16 44 97,848 64.1 
22 732 47 45 290,472 63.5 
23 64,955 29 46 87,754 67.4 
  
The objective of this study was not to obtain perfect 
identification but rather seek to reduce the volume of 
traffic an investigator would have to analyze – a 
reduction on average of half is excellent. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
The use of transparent biometrics to support the 
proactive and reactive identification of insider misuse 
is a flexible and robust approach to providing a strong 
link between information and the use of information by 
employees. The experiments performed into biometric 
imprinting within digital objects focused upon its 
ability to robustly embed and retrieve a biometric 
signature even after significant modification – an 
expectation in many cases of information leakage. 
Using stenographic approaches, the experiments have 
shown it is possible, even with 95% of the image 
having been modified. The experiments into the 
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reactive identification of users from network traffic has 
also shown that up to 86% of traffic can be 
successfully attributed – which provides for a huge 
reduction in traffic analysis. Used alongside IP address, 
which for small windows of time can be assumed to 
come from the same user, provides for a very effective 
approach reducing the volume of data to be analyzed. 
Furthermore, these techniques could also be utilized 
together to provide further verification that the digital 
object imprinted by a user was indeed sent by the same 
user (although albeit to a lower confidence). 
That said, there a number of challenges that exist 
that require further research to investigate: 
• the ability to utilise a wider range of digital 
objects. Differing objects have varying degrees of 
stability due to their structure. For example, word 
documents and their underlying data structure can 
change considerably given small alterations to a 
file. Therefore, alternative approaches need to be 
developed that overcome this (e.g. the use of 
higher-level objects whose orientation does not 
move)	
• the use of multibiometric signals within the 
imprinting process. How much data can reliable be 
imprinted and what effect will this have when the 
file is modified. It is expected there will be a trade-
off between the volume of imprinted data and the 
percentage a digital object can be modified.	
• the identification performance that can be 
achieved within a multibiometric system – using 
multi-instance, multi-sample and in the proactive 
approach multimodal techniques. 	
• how to apply both classification and logic to user 
interactions to further reduce the volume of traffic 
that needs to be analyse	
• visualisation techniques that can present, 
interrogate and interact with digital objects and 
network traffic to provide a responsive and user 
friendly forensic tool	
• the scalability and performance characteristics of 
an operational system. How much processing is 
required to parse and present the data. Can the 
system achieve near real-time visualisation of user 
traffic? This begins to turn the reactive approach 
also into a more proactive SIEM based approach.	
It is worth highlighting in both approaches, there is 
not a need (although potentially desirable) to verify the 
identity perfectly/correctly. The approaches exist to 
narrow the focus of an investigation to a subset of 
individuals who investigators can then focus upon in 
more upon. So even in cases where the perpetrator was 
not listed first in the identification process, as long as 
their name appears towards the top of the list, this 
would provide the capability for investigators to more 
quickly identify the guilty and build a case of evidence 
against them. In organizations with large volumes of 
employees this will be particularly useful. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work  
 
The paper has presented a holistic approach to aid 
an incident analyst in establishing and investigating a 
case of insider misuse – particularly with respect to 
information leakage, although the reactive approach 
would be useful in all cases. The resulting experiments 
performed to validate the fundamental approach have 
proved very encouraging. 
The ability to identify an individual is however 
largely dependent upon the performance of the 
underlying biometric modalities utilized and further 
work is required on developing these individually and 
in the case of the proactive approach also 
multimodal/multibiometric models. Further work will 
also be undertaken into investigating the capabilities 
with regards to forgability and circumventabilty in 
order to ensure the system is robust against targeted 
attack. 
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